In this paper, a semantic basis for Possibility Theory based on likelihood functions is presented. In some cases, possibilities have been considered as approximations of Shafer plausibility measures. This approximation exchanges exactness of plausibility values for the simplicity of use of possibility values. In this paper, a different direction is followed. Possibility measures are considered as the supremum of a family of likelihood functions. This is an exact interpretation, not an approximation. The minimum rule to combine possibility distributions is justified in this framework under general conditions. Conditions under which other rules can be applied are also studied.
INTRODUCTION
One of the most controversial issues in uncertainty modelling and information sciences is the relationship between probability theory and Ž w x. fuzzy sets Zadeh 31 . Many probability advocates have considered fuzzy sets as ill-interpreted probabilities combined in an ad hoc manner. Related to fuzzy sets is the theory of possibility that has been around for 15 Ž w x w x. years under this name Zadeh 32 , Dubois and Prade 5 but whose w x calculation rules go back to Shackle 23 , at least. Possibility theory can be more directly compared to probability theory than fuzzy sets because it also proposes set-functions that quantify the uncertainty of events. A U w x possibility measure on a finite set U is a mapping from 2 to 0, 1 , such that ⌸ л s 0, ⌸ U s 1 1 Ž . Ž . Ž .
w x It is completely characterized by a possibility distribution : U ª 0, 1 Ž . Ž . Ä Ž . 4 such that a s 1 for some a g U, since ⌸ A s Max a ¬ a g A . In
Ž . the infinite case the equivalence between and ⌸ requires axiom 2 to w x be extended to an infinite family of subsets. Zadeh 32 views the possibility distribution as stemming from the membership function of a F fuzzy set F. Hence the controversy between possibility and probability Ž w x. measures is related to the one about fuzzy sets e.g., Cheeseman 3 . Instead of pursuing sterile polemics, another attitude is to relate fuzzy sets, possibility distributions, and probability. The history of such a relationship is already quite long and we shall only point out two existing bridges between probability and fuzzy sets viewed as possibility distribuw x tions. See Dubois and Prade 12 for a more complete discussion.
A first point of view is to acknowledge a possibility measure as an upper Ž . probability envelope. Namely if we consider a set of probabilities P P ⌸ s Ä < Ž .
Ž . 4 Ž . P P A F ⌸ A , ᭙A : U , then the induced upper probabilities P* A Ä Ž . Ž .4 Ž . s Sup P A ¬ P g P P ⌸ coincide with the possibility degrees ⌸ A . The possibility distribution is then defined by Ä 4 a s P* a , ᭙a g U. 3
Ž . Ž . Ž .
Ž .
The set P P ⌸ is never empty due to the normalization of the possibility Ž Ž . . distribution i.e., ᭚A, ⌸ A s 1 . This view is adopted in Dubois and w x Prade 6 , for instance. More recently a characteristic condition has been given under which a set of probability measures induced by lower bounds of probabilities of specified events leads to possibility measures. Namely Ä < Ž . 4 Ž . P P s P P A G a , i s 1, . . . , n s P P ⌸ for some possibility measure ⌸ This view of possibility measures as upper bounds of a family of probability measures was adopted in the late seventies in a more restricted Ž framework, namely that of random sets and belief function theory Shafer w x. w x w x 25 . Several scholars such as Fortet and Kambouzia 13 , Orlov 20 , w x w x w x w x Kampe de Feriet 18 , Sales 21 , Goodman 14 , Wang and Sanchez 30 ,´w x and Dubois and Prade 4 pointed out that given a random set R R on U, i.e., a set of subsets A , . . . , A g U, and a mass assignment m such that 1 Another point of view is to interpret the membership function of a fuzzy set as a likelihood function. This idea is actually quite old in fuzzy set theory since it has been the basis of experimental methods for constructing membership functions. Given a population of individuals and a fuzzy concept F, each individual is asked whether a given element u g U can be Ž . called an F or not. The likelihood function P ЈFЈ ¬ u is then obtained and represents the proportion of individuals that answered yes to the question. Then it is natural to let
F w x These types of Yes᎐No experiments have been used by Hersh et al. 16 w x w x and Hisdal 17 . Cheeseman 3 exploits this link and claims that on such grounds fuzzy sets are nothing new. Here we suggest that this link will lead to a cross-fertilization of fuzzy set and likelihood theories, provided that one does not stick to a dogmatic Bayesian position.
Direct relationships between possibility distributions and likelihood w x w x functions have been pointed out by Smets 26 and Thomas 27, 28 . Indeed the likelihood function is treated as a possibility distribution in classical statistics for so-called likelihood ratio tests. Namely if some hypothesis of the form u g A is to be tested against the opposite hypothesis u f A on the basis of observation O alone, and the knowledge of elementary Ž < . likelihood functions P O u , u g U, then the likelihood ratio test method-Ž < . ology suggests the comparison between Max P O u and Max
e., ⌸ A and ⌸ A letting u s P O u see, e.g., Barnett 1,  x. w x p. 150 . Thomas 28 also indicates that the Bayesian updating procedure
can be interpreted in terms of fuzzy observations. For instance if p represents the base rate of the size of some population, and one learns that the concerned individual is ''tall,'' where ''tall'' is defined by membership function , then the a posteriori probability can be computed in Ž . The two probability-oriented views upper probability and likelihood of fuzzy sets and possibility distributions are not antagonist and can be Ž . reconciled. For instance 4 corresponds to another experiment for constructing membership functions whereby individuals are asked to point out a single crisp subset A : U that represents some fuzzy concept F best. 
Another way of relating the two approaches is to notice that the use of Ž w x . the Dempster rule Shafer 25, pp. 57᎐73 to combine two belief functions, one of which being a probability function, leads to a probability function Ž . Ž . that is computed via 7 or 8 exactly. Namely let Bel be defined by
Ž . where Bel [ Bel is a probability measure and is defined by 4 . Only 1 2 F Ž . the plausibility of singletons i.e., the possibility distribution is useful for the updating, and it plays the role of a likelihood function. The above results suggest how to get likelihood functions from belief functions. The w x converse problem is addressed by Shafer 24 . In this paper it is suggested Ž that an observation O defines a consonant belief function whose associ-. ated plausibility is a possibility measure with mass assignment given by
Ž. Ž <. normalized , and letting a s P O a then this procedure is exactly the Ž . w x converse of Eq. 4 , as already proposed in Dubois and Prade 4 .
Another way of putting together the upper probability approach and the likelihood approach to possibility theory is to consider a family of likelihood functions and to define a possibility as the upper envelope of this family. Ž More concretely we shall consider that the possibility distribution not . necessarily normalized associated with an observation O is
where P P is a set of possible probability distributions and it is assumed that this set P P cannot specify anything about the a priori probabilities in U.
That is, P P can only give information about conditional probabilities of the observations given the true value from U. The result will be that a possibility distribution will be an upper bound of the possible likelihood functions.
The main contributions of this paper will be to justify the calculus of
agA as an exact value, not as an approximation. Note that we will have
½ 5
a g A which should not be confused with the first view we mentioned where
Besides, this framework will also enable us to consider the possibility distribution,
PgP P in association with the set function 
Moreover, we shall study the problem of combination justifying the use of the Min rule, as an exact procedure when no additional information is available. Usually the Min rule is justified in the literature under mutual dependence or coherence of observations.
POSSIBILITY MEASURES

Ž
. If U is a set finite or infinite , we define a possibility measure in U as a U w x mapping ⌸: 2 ª 0, 1 satisfying
Ž . A mapping ⌸: 2 ª 0, 1 satisfying properties 1 and 3 is called a Ž . non-normalized possibility measure. Although property 2 is not enforced, ⌸ verifies the following property:
In this paper, we shall deal with non-normalized measures mainly. w x According to Zadeh 32 , this normalization is not compulsory.
A normalized possibility measure on U can be defined from a possibility distribution on U, that is, a mapping w x : Uª 0, 1 19 Ž .
such that
Ž .
The possibility measure in U is defined by
Ž . For a non-normalized measure condition 20 is not always verified and, in general, we have
Given a possibility measure in U, its associated possibility distribution is defined by
However, in general, on infinite sets a possibility measure is not always defined by its possibility distribution. As an example, consider in the set of reals the possibility measure assigning a value of 0 to the finite sets and a value of 1 to the infinite sets. The associated possibility distribution is Ž . always 0, and condition 21 cannot be verified. To ensure that a possibility measure can be defined by its possibility distribution, we need to change Ž . property 3 into a stronger property:
In this paper we shall see that a non-normalized possibility measure Ž . verifying property 3Ј can be recovered from its possibility distribution Ž . through Eq. 21 .
We shall assume that there is a finite set of elementary observations, Before going on we need some definitions about imprecise probabilities Ž w x. see 2 for a deeper study in the finite case.
If we have two arbitrary sets, U , U , an a priori imprecise probabilistic 1 2 information on U will be a convex set P P of probability measures defined
is the set of all the possible probability measures on U , 2 , a i i conditional probability on U given U will be a mapping, 2 1 P :Uª I I. 2 4 Ž .
Ž . Ž < . If a g U and A : U , P a is usually denoted by P и a , and
A conditional imprecise probabilistic information will be a convex set P P of conditional probabilities on U given U .
Given an a priori piece of information on U , 2 , P P , and a condi- 1 1 tional piece of information on U given U , P P , we can build a bidimen-
sional probability on U = U , given by the convex set of probabilities,
where CH stands for the convex hull operator and
have the equalities
Ž . for all the elements u g U y N, where N is a set with P N s 0.
This equality is a consequence of the definition of conditional probabilw x Ž . ity in the general case 19, pp. 370᎐384 and equality 26 . One has
There is no necessity of defining probabilities on a -algebra of measurable sets, because Ž . from a probability distribution on U, A A , where A A is a -algebra we can define a convex set Ž U . 
In this paper these concepts will be applied to the case in which U s U As U is finite a probability measure can be given by means of its 2 probability distribution, always denoted by the same symbol in lowercase. The type of probabilistic information giving rise to a possibility on U will be a convex set of probability measure P P defined on the set U = O O, such that it can be expressed in the following way, P P s I I = P P s P = P ¬ P g I I , P g P P .
3 0 Ä 4 Ž .
That is, it is equal to the combination of a conditional piece of information with the a priori I I , which is equal to all the possible probability 1 measures on U. This combination does not say anything a priori about the true value in U. It only relates 2 the true value on U with observations from a set O O. A possibility measure on U will be determined when an observation from O O is selected. 2 The conditional information is the only one that is meaningful of the two combined pieces of information.
Since I I is the set of all the probability measures on U, we do not need 1 Ž . to apply the convex hull operator in expression 30 as was done in Ž .
X expression 25 . In effect, it can be easily proved that if there exists P P 2 <1 ŽÄ X 4. such that P P s CH P = P ¬ P g P P , P g P P then we can find a
The following theorem gives the exact formulation of our semantics of Ž . non-normalized possibility measures with property 3Ј . Gi¨en a set U, a mapping ⌸: 2 ª 0, 1 is a non-neces 
Ž . Ž < . where if P A s 0, then P O A is not considered in the supremum and the supremum of the empty set is equal to 0.
Ž .
U w x Proof. Assume a triplet O O, P P, O and ⌸ a mapping from 2 into 0, 1 Ž . verifying 32 . We are going to show that, in this case, ⌸ is a possibility Ž . measure verifying 3Ј . w x Let : U ª 0, 1 defined by
First we are going to prove the equality
Ž . To do this, consider a g A and P g P P. According to 31 we have 0 P s P = P , 3 5 Ž .
where P g I I , P g P P .
Let PЈ be the probability in U = O O defined by
a 2<1 0 Ž Ž . where P is the probability measure degenerated in a P B s1 if and a 0 a 0 0 . only if a g B and is equal to 0 otherwise and P is in P P .
We have that PЈ g P P, because I I is the family of all the probabilities in 1 U, and
H 2<1
What we have shown is that ᭙a g A, P g P P, there exists PЈ g P P such
0 Therefore, we have
That is,
Ž . On the other hand, taking into account 29 , for every P g P P we have
where P g I I and P g P P .
Taking into account the properties of the integral,
That is, for every P g P P there is a conditional probability P g P P 2 <1 2 < 1 such that
Taking supremum in P g P P , we have that for every P g P P
Now, taking supremum in P g P P, we have
Pg P P where
In these conditions, it is immediate that
Ž . In the proof of the If part we have shown that from this equality Ž Ž .. Ž Ž .. Eq. 33 and given P P s I I = P P we can deduce Eq. 34
Ž . Ž . This equality together with 47 gives the desired result, 32 .
Ž . Ž .
Ž . Putting together 32 , 33 , and 34 , what has really been obtained is that
Ž . In other words ⌸ A is the upper bound of the likelihood function Ž < . Ä Ž < . 4 P O A when only the likelihoods P O a ¬ a g A, P g P P are available. This result is not surprising. Indeed, consider the case when P P contains a Ž < . single element P O и and A is finite. Then Theorem 1 claims that
The above inequality is obvious noticing that
smaller than the maximum among these elementary likelihoods. The calculus of possibility theory is thus closely related to the maximum likelihood principle.
Ž . The equality 53 leads us as well to the inequality
More generally, an analogue of Theorem 1 can be established for the definition of guaranteed possibility function ⌬ in terms of a set of likelihood functions. Namely,
where Ј is not necessarily anti-normalized . Note that Ј F , where Ž . is defined by 33 .
Ž Ž . Ž .. Thus, in this framework, the pair ⌬ A , ⌸ A is interpreted as the minimum and the maximum of the probabilities to get the observation O given that we are in A, over a convex set of probabilities. This clearly estimates the plausibility to be in A when O is observed from an abductive reasoning point of view, that is, when the aim is to find a set of hypotheses explaining the current observations.
COMBINATION OF POSSIBILITY MEASURES
Before deducing the combination formulas we give some previously known concepts and results. 
Following this definition we can say that the possibility measure associ-Ž . ated with a triplet according to Theorem 1 is the most specific of all the possibility measures satisfying it.
The definition of consequence for two possibility measures is immediate. 
Ž .
Ž . It is immediate that this definition is equivalent to ⌸ A F ⌸Ј A , U Ž ᭙A g 2 that is, the possibility ⌸ is more informative than ⌸Ј, according w x. to Zadeh 32 . This definition can be expressed in terms of possibility distributions as it is done in the following theorem.
Ž . T HEOREM 2. If ⌸ is a possibility measure on U and O O, P P, O is a triplet, then ⌸¨erifies the triplet if and only if
where is the possibility distribution associated with ⌸.
Proof. We give only a sketch of the proof. We have to show given a Ž .
if and only if,
Ž . Ž . The If part is based on 21 and the inequality
Ž . The Only If part is based on the fact that P P s I I = P P , then
Ž . ᭙ PgP P ,᭙ Ag2 , ᭙a g A, we can find see Eqs. 35 to 38 in the proof . of Theorem 1 a probability PЈ in P P such that
Conjuncti¨e Rules
For the possibility measure induced by two measures, ⌸ and ⌸ , we 1 2 consider the case in which ⌸ and ⌸ come from two different observa- 1 2 tions, O and O . The induced possibility has to be associated with the 1 2 intersection of the observations, O l O . We could obtain the same 1 2 result considering that the two possibility measures satisfy the same triplet and therefore the same observation, but we think that this is a more general and realistic case. The following theorem justifies the use of the minimum rule applied to the possibility distributions to calculate a consequence of two possibility measures, ⌸ and ⌸ . and ⌸ then by Theorem 2,
we have
, and
Ž . 
Now, let us calculate the value of the right part of this inequality,
To calculate this supremum, we only have to calculate
Ä Ž . Ž .4 Ž . that is, Min a , a . As this is the value of the right part of 69 , we 1 2 get the desired inequality.
If and are two possibility distributions, then n s This justifies the use of the Min rule to combine two possibility distributions: it is the most specific knowledge that is a consequence of both distributions. It is important to remark that no specific knowledge is required about the relationships between the observations O and O 1 2 defining the combined possibility measures. The minimum rule can be applied in the general case. It is not a particular case when we know that Ž . O and O are coherent one of them implies the other . 1 2 Another important observation is that, in general, the possibility mea-Ä 4 sure associated with Min , is not the minimum of the possibility 1 2 Ä 4 measures Min ⌸ , ⌸ . The minimum of the possibility measures is in 1 2 general greater than or equal to that of the measure associated with the minimum of the possibility distributions. This result is to be considered in w x connection with another one by Dubois and Prade 9 , namely that the only way of aggregating possibility measures so as to get another possibility measure via a direct combination of the possibilities of each event is by Ž using the maximum of the possibility degrees possibly transformed by . monotonically increasing functions , i.e.,
Ž . Ž . Ž Ž . with f 0 s f 0 s 0, f and f monotonically increasing, and Max f 1 ,
Other rules can be justified when specific knowledge is available about the relationships between the observations. The following definitions and theorems are given for these special conditions. The first is given for the combination of independent possibility measures. 
The theorem justifies the use of the product rule. and are their possibility distributions, then ⌸ n ⌸ * ⌸ if and only if
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . 
Ž . Condition 75 expresses that given the true value u g U, then the probability of the intersection of the observations is minimum. 
Ž .
Proof. The proof is immediate from equality 75 .
Disjuncti¨e Rules
Disjunctive rules will be applied to the combination of two possibility measures coming from two observations when we know that one of the observations is true but we do not know which one is true. We start with the deduction of a general rule, under no special conditions. DEFINITION 6. If ⌸, ⌸ , and ⌸ are possibility measures on U, we say 1 2 that ⌸ is a consequence of the disjunction of measures ⌸ and ⌸ and ⌸ then by Theorem 2,
we have 
To calculate this supremum, we only have to calculate 1 2 we get the desired inequality.
It is important to remark that the general rule for disjunctive combination is not the dual t-conorm of the minimum. 4 It is the rule corresponding to the mutually exclusive model. The reason is that the general rule goes to the greatest value for the combination and this is obtained in the mutually exclusive model. Other rules can be obtained under special conditions:
Independence model. Under condition 73 we get
Mutual dependence model. Under the condition
we get
Negation
The negation has a more difficult justification in our framework. According to our methodology if a possibility ⌸ is associated with an observation O the negation of it, ! ⌸ should be associated with the complementary of the observation, O. However, the possibility is an upper bound:
Ž . Knowing only the value ⌸ A and not P P, what is the upper bound that Ä Ž < . 4 can be deduced for P O A ¬ P g P P ? The answer is only the trivial one: 1. Indeed, if we follow a method analogous to the case of the conjunctive and disjunctive rules, then we should consider all the triplets satisfied by ⌸ and try to find an upper bound for the probabilities Ä Ž < .4 P O A . This upper bound is given by the possibility assigning 1 to every event, A.
4 w x A t-conorm, H , is an associative, commutative, nondecreasing binary operation on 0, 1 w x verifying a H 0 s a, ᭙a g 0, 1 . A t-norm, HЈ, verifies the same properties except that w x aHЈ1sa, ᭙ag 0, 1 . A t-conorm, H , and a t-norm HЈ are dual when x H y s 1 y ŽŽ . Ž .. w x 1 y xH Ј1 y y. See 22, pp. 65᎐75 for more details.
We can obtain more precise results for the negation of a possibility measure if we add some hypothesis about the set P P. For example, when we know that the set of possible probability measures, P P in U = O O is given by I I = P P , but there is only one probability measure in P P : 1 2 < 1 2 < 1 Ä 4 P P s P . In this case the conditional relationship between the observa-2 <1 2 < 1 tion and the value from U is perfectly known and the supremum for Ä Ž < . 4 P O A ¬ P g P P can be calculated. Let ! ⌸ be the possibility measure associated to observation O. If ! is the possibility associated with ! ⌸, then we have ! a s 1 y a , ᭙a g U. 9 0 Ž . Ž . Ž .
The situation changes if instead of having a possibility measure, what we Ž Ž . Ž .. have is the pair ⌬ A , ⌸ A : the minimum and the maximum of the probabilities to get the observation O given that we are in A, over a Ž . convex set of probabilities. In this case the negation of ⌬, ⌸ , will be the pair associated with O, the complement of the observation. As Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .
where ! ⌬ s 1 y ⌸ and ! ⌸ s 1 y ⌬ are associated with observation O, and are respectively the guaranteed possibility function defined from ! Ž Ž . . and the possibility measure defined from 1 y Ј Ј given by 56 .
CONCLUSIONS
We have given a semantical justification of the calculus associated with possibility measures and distributions, in terms of upper and lower probabilities.
Two important consequences of this relationship can be laid bare:
Ž . 1 Possibility measures are appropriate when there is no a priori information about the true value of the hypotheses. We only have some conditional information relating each hypothesis to the corresponding observations. For example, with no a priori information about the probability of a set of diseases, a symptom induces a possibility measure on this set, which coincides with the likelihood function.
Ž .
2 Possibility measures can be combined without knowing the relationships between the observations underlying them. For example, we do not have to know whether the observations are independent or disjoint. This is a clear advantage over other more demanding reasoning systems, as the Bayesian one, in which to combine the information coming from two pieces of evidence we have to assume or to know some relationship between the pieces of evidence in order to determine the appropriate combination. Other rules can be applied when these relationships are known.
